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DELTA: DEsigning a stealthy trigger mechanism for analog hardware trojans and its detection analysis

Published: 23 August 2022 Publication History

Abstract

This paper presents a stealthy triggering mechanism that reduces the dependencies of analog hardware Trojans on the frequent toggling of the software-controlled rare nets. The trigger to activate the Trojan is generated by using a glitch generation circuit and a clock signal, which increases the selectivity and feasibility of the trigger signal. The proposed trigger is able to evade the state-of-the-art run-time detection (R2D2) and Built-In Acceleration Structure (BIAS) schemes. Furthermore, the simulation results show that the proposed trigger circuit incurs a minimal overhead in side-channel footprints in terms of area (29 transistors), delay (less than 1ps in the clock cycle), and power (1μW).

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Cited By

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  • (2024)DAWN: Efficient Trojan Detection in Analog Circuits Using Circuit Watermarking and Neural TwinsIEEE Transactions on Computer-Aided Design of Integrated Circuits and Systems10.1109/TCAD.2024.338494843:10(2930-2943)Online publication date: Oct-2024
  • (2024)SPICED: Syntactical Bug and Trojan Pattern Identification in A/MS Circuits using LLM-Enhanced Detection2024 IEEE Physical Assurance and Inspection of Electronics (PAINE)10.1109/PAINE62042.2024.10792717(1-7)Online publication date: 12-Nov-2024

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cover image ACM Conferences
DAC '22: Proceedings of the 59th ACM/IEEE Design Automation Conference
July 2022
1462 pages
ISBN:9781450391429
DOI:10.1145/3489517
Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from [email protected]

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Published: 23 August 2022

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  • German Research Foundation (DFG), project SecuReFET

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DAC '22: 59th ACM/IEEE Design Automation Conference
July 10 - 14, 2022
California, San Francisco

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Cited By

View all
  • (2024)DAWN: Efficient Trojan Detection in Analog Circuits Using Circuit Watermarking and Neural TwinsIEEE Transactions on Computer-Aided Design of Integrated Circuits and Systems10.1109/TCAD.2024.338494843:10(2930-2943)Online publication date: Oct-2024
  • (2024)SPICED: Syntactical Bug and Trojan Pattern Identification in A/MS Circuits using LLM-Enhanced Detection2024 IEEE Physical Assurance and Inspection of Electronics (PAINE)10.1109/PAINE62042.2024.10792717(1-7)Online publication date: 12-Nov-2024

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