Kun Jin
ABSTRACT
We study the design of a class of incentive mechanisms that can effectively prevent cheating in a strategic classification and regression problem. A conventional strategic classification or regression problem is modeled as a Stackelberg game, or a principal-agent problem between the designer of a classifier (the principal) and individuals subject to the classifier's decisions (the agents), potentially from different demographic groups. The former benefits from the accuracy of its decisions, whereas the latter may have an incentive to game the algorithm into making favorable but erroneous decisions. While prior works tend to focus on how to design an algorithm to be more robust to such strategic maneuvering, this study focuses on an alternative, which is to design incentive mechanisms to shape the utilities of the agents and induce effort that genuinely improves their skills, which in turn benefits both parties in the Stackelberg game. Specifically, the principal and the mechanism provider (which could also be the principal itself) move together in the first stage, publishing and committing to a classifier and an incentive mechanism. The agents are (simultaneous) second movers and best respond to the published classifier and incentive mechanism. When an agent's strategic action merely changes its observable features, it hurts the performance of the algorithm. However, if the action leads to improvement in the agent's true label, it not only helps the agent achieve better decision outcomes, but also preserves the performance of the algorithm. We study how a subsidy mechanism can induce improvement actions, positively impact a number of social well-being metrics, such as the overall skill levels of the agents (efficiency) and positive or true positive rate differences between different demographic groups (fairness).
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Index Terms
- Incentive Mechanisms for Strategic Classification and Regression Problems
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