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Mechanism Design with a Common Dataset

Published:13 July 2022Publication History

ABSTRACT

I propose a new approach to mechanism design: rather than assume a common prior belief, assume access to a common dataset. I restrict attention to incomplete information games where a designer commits to a policy and a single agent responds. I propose a penalized policy that performs well under weak assumptions on how the agent learns from data. Policies that are too complex, in a precise sense, are penalized because they lead to unpredictable responses by the agent. This approach leads to new insights in models of vaccine distribution, prescription drug approval, performance pay, and product bundling.

The full paper is available at https://mkcamara.github.io/mdcd.pdf.

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          cover image ACM Conferences
          EC '22: Proceedings of the 23rd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation
          July 2022
          1269 pages
          ISBN:9781450391504
          DOI:10.1145/3490486

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          Association for Computing Machinery

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          Publication History

          • Published: 13 July 2022

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