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The Science of the Deal: Optimal Bargaining on eBay Using Deep Reinforcement Learning

Published:13 July 2022Publication History

ABSTRACT

Bargaining is ubiquitous. How can people bargain better? We train a reinforcement learning agent to bargain optimally in "Best Offer" listings on eBay, and we characterize its behavior in a manner that humans can use. As a buyer, the agent starts lower than human buyers and bargains longer. As the seller, the agent interprets offers as signals---of the buyer's willingness to pay and of the item's desirability---that human sellers ignore. Simple strategies derived from these agents purchase more items for lower prices than human buyers and sell more items for higher prices than human sellers.

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        cover image ACM Conferences
        EC '22: Proceedings of the 23rd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation
        July 2022
        1269 pages
        ISBN:9781450391504
        DOI:10.1145/3490486

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        Publication History

        • Published: 13 July 2022

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