research-article

Routing Games in the Wild: Efficiency, Equilibration, Regret, and a Price of Anarchy Bound via Long Division

Authors:

Barnabé Monnot,

Francisco Benita,

Georgios PiliourasAuthors Info & Claims

ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation, Volume 10, Issue 1

Article No.: 2, Pages 1 - 26

https://doi.org/10.1145/3512747

Published: 08 April 2022 Publication History

Abstract

Routing games are amongst the most well studied domains of game theory. How relevant are these pen-and-paper calculations to understanding the reality of everyday traffic routing? We focus on a semantically rich dataset that captures detailed information about the daily behavior of thousands of Singaporean commuters and examine the following basic questions:

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Does the traffic stabilize?

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Is the system behavior consistent with latency-minimizing agents?

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Is the resulting system efficient?

In order to capture the efficiency of the traffic network in a way that agrees with our everyday intuition we introduce a new metric, the Free-flow Index (FFI), which reflects the inefficiency resulting from system congestion. Along the way, we provide the first model-free computation of an upper bound to the price of anarchy utilizing only real world measurements of traffic data.

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Cited By

Koohy BBuermann JYazdanpanah VBriggs PPschierer-Barnfather PGerding EStein SDastani MSichman JAlechina NDignum V(2024)Adaptive Incentive Engineering in Citizen-Centric AIProceedings of the 23rd International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems10.5555/3635637.3663258(2684-2689)Online publication date: 6-May-2024
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.5555/3635637.3663258
Carissimo C(2024) Counter-Intuitive Effects of Q -Learning Exploration in a Congestion Dilemma IEEE Access10.1109/ACCESS.2024.335860812(15984-15996)Online publication date: 2024
https://doi.org/10.1109/ACCESS.2024.3358608
Seaton JBrown P(2023)On the Intrinsic Fragility of the Price of AnarchyIEEE Control Systems Letters10.1109/LCSYS.2023.33353157(3573-3578)Online publication date: 2023
https://doi.org/10.1109/LCSYS.2023.3335315
Show More Cited By

Index Terms

Routing Games in the Wild: Efficiency, Equilibration, Regret, and a Price of Anarchy Bound via Long Division
1. Theory of computation
  1. Theory and algorithms for application domains
    1. Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design
      1. Exact and approximate computation of equilibria
      2. Representations of games and their complexity

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Published In

cover image ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation

ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation Volume 10, Issue 1

March 2022

149 pages

ISSN:2167-8375

EISSN:2167-8383

DOI:10.1145/3505215

Editors:
David Pennock
Rutgers University, USA
,
Ilya Segal
Stanford University, USA

Issue’s Table of Contents

Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than the author(s) must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from [email protected].

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Association for Computing Machinery

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Publication History

Published: 08 April 2022

Accepted: 01 October 2021

Revised: 01 May 2021

Received: 01 July 2019

Published in TEAC Volume 10, Issue 1

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Ministry of Education, Singapore
MOE AcRF Tier 2
NRF
Singapore National Research Foundation (NRF)

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Cited By

Koohy BBuermann JYazdanpanah VBriggs PPschierer-Barnfather PGerding EStein SDastani MSichman JAlechina NDignum V(2024)Adaptive Incentive Engineering in Citizen-Centric AIProceedings of the 23rd International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems10.5555/3635637.3663258(2684-2689)Online publication date: 6-May-2024
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.5555/3635637.3663258
Carissimo C(2024) Counter-Intuitive Effects of Q -Learning Exploration in a Congestion Dilemma IEEE Access10.1109/ACCESS.2024.335860812(15984-15996)Online publication date: 2024
https://doi.org/10.1109/ACCESS.2024.3358608
Seaton JBrown P(2023)On the Intrinsic Fragility of the Price of AnarchyIEEE Control Systems Letters10.1109/LCSYS.2023.33353157(3573-3578)Online publication date: 2023
https://doi.org/10.1109/LCSYS.2023.3335315
Benita FBansal GPiliouras GTunçer B(2023)Understanding short-distance travel to school in Singapore: A data-driven approachTravel Behaviour and Society10.1016/j.tbs.2023.01.00731(349-362)Online publication date: Apr-2023
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tbs.2023.01.007

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