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SPFail: discovering, measuring, and remediating vulnerabilities in email sender validation

Published:25 October 2022Publication History

ABSTRACT

Email is an important medium for Internet communication. Secure email infrastructure is therefore of utmost importance. In this paper we discuss two software vulnerabilities discovered in libSPF2, a library used by mail servers across the Internet for email sender validation with the Sender Policy Framework (SPF). We describe a technique to remotely detect the vulnerabilities in a production mail server, and we use that technique to quantify the vulnerability of Internet mail servers. We also monitor the patch rate of affected servers by performing continuous measurement over a period of roughly four months. We identify thousands of vulnerable mail servers, some associated with high-profile mail providers. Even after private notifications and public disclosure of the vulnerabilities roughly 80% of the vulnerable servers remain vulnerable.

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            cover image ACM Conferences
            IMC '22: Proceedings of the 22nd ACM Internet Measurement Conference
            October 2022
            796 pages
            ISBN:9781450392594
            DOI:10.1145/3517745

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            Publication History

            • Published: 25 October 2022

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