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Leakage of Sensitive Information to Third-Party Voice Applications

Published:15 September 2022Publication History

ABSTRACT

In this paper we investigate the issue of sensitive information leakage to third-party voice applications in voice assistant ecosystems. We focus specifically on leakage of sensitive information via the conversational interface. We use a bespoke testing infrastructure to investigate leakage of sensitive information via the conversational interface of Google Actions and Alexa Skills. Our work augments prior work in this area to consider not only specific categories of personal data, but also other types of potentially sensitive information that may be disclosed in voice-based interactions with third-party voice applications. Our findings indicate that current privacy and security measures for third-party voice applications are not sufficient to prevent leakage of all types of sensitive information via the conversational interface. We make key recommendations for the redesign of voice assistant architectures to better prevent leakage of sensitive information via the conversational interface of third-party voice applications in the future.

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          • Published in

            cover image ACM Other conferences
            CUI '22: Proceedings of the 4th Conference on Conversational User Interfaces
            July 2022
            289 pages
            ISBN:9781450397391
            DOI:10.1145/3543829

            Copyright © 2022 ACM

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            New York, NY, United States

            Publication History

            • Published: 15 September 2022

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            • short-paper
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            • Refereed limited

            Acceptance Rates

            CUI '22 Paper Acceptance Rate12of33submissions,36%Overall Acceptance Rate34of100submissions,34%

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