EC

In this paper, we introduce an over-time variant of the well-known prophet inequality with i.i.d. random variables. Instead of stopping with one realized value at some point in the process, we decide for each step how long we select the value. Then we ...

Over the past few years, more and more Internet advertisers have started using automated bidding for optimizing their advertising campaigns. Such advertisers have an optimization goal (e.g. to maximize conversions), and some constraints (e.g. a budget ...

We study the problem of online binary classification where strategic agents can manipulate their observable features in predefined ways, modeled by a manipulation graph, in order to receive a positive classification. We show this setting differs in ...

According to the fundamental theorems of welfare economics, any competitive equilibrium is Pareto efficient. Unfortunately, competitive equilibrium prices only exist under strong assumptions such as perfectly divisible goods and convex preferences. In ...

Public agencies are often tasked with allocating scarce resources (such as public housing or financial aid) to a target population. In many such cases, the goal is to maximize social welfare, which requires identifying agents who have the highest ...

The existence of EFX allocations is a fundamental open problem in discrete fair division. Since the general problem has been elusive, progress is made on two fronts: (i) proving existence when the number of agents is small, and (ii) proving the ...

Online privacy protection has gained momentum in recent years and spurred both government policies and private initiatives. A hallmark of this movement is the ongoing removal of third-party cookies - a device widely adopted to track online user ...

Auto-bidding has recently become a popular feature in ad auctions. This feature enables advertisers to simply provide high-level constraints and goals to an automated agent, which optimizes their auction bids on their behalf. These auto-bidding ...

An important feature of matching markets is that there typically exist many stable matchings. These matchings have a remarkable orderliness property in two-sided markets. They form a lattice according to the group preferences of one side that is ...

In many centralized labor markets candidates interview with potential employers before matches are formed through a clearinghouse. One prominent example is the market for medical residencies and fellowships, which in recent years has had a large ...

We study a generalization of both the classic single-dimensional mechanism design problem, and the hidden-action principal-agent problem of contract theory [c.f., Alon et al. 2021]. In this setting, the principal seeks to incentivize an agent with a ...

Fair allocation of indivisible goods has attracted extensive attention over the last two decades, yielding numerous elegant algorithmic results and producing challenging open questions. The problem becomes much harder in the presence of strategic ...

In this work, we revisit the multi-item order fulfillment model introduced by [Jasin and Sinha 2015]. Specifically, we study a dynamic setting in which an e-commerce platform (or online retailer) with multiple warehouses and finite inventory is faced ...

Adversarial team games model multiplayer strategic interactions in which a team of identically-interested players is competing against an adversarial player in a zero-sum game. Such games capture many well-studied settings in algorithmic game theory, ...

Suppose that we have n agents and n items which lie in a shared metric space. We would like to match the agents to items such that the total distance from agents to their matched items is as small as possible. However, instead of having direct access ...

Many multi-agent machine learning settings can be modeled as games, from social or economic systems with algorithmic decision-makers to popular learning architectures such as generative adversarial networks (GANs). Desired outcomes in these settings ...

We study an agency model in which the principal has outcome data under different incentive schemes and aims to design an optimal contract under minimal assumptions about the way the agent responds to incentives. Events unfold as follows: (1) the ...

A seller wants to sell an indivisible item to n buyers. The buyer valuations are drawn i.i.d. from a distribution, but the seller does not know this distribution; the seller only knows the support [a, b]. To be robust against the lack of knowledge of ...

The design of online policies for stochastic matching and revenue management settings is usually bound by the Bayesian prior that the demand process is formed by a fixed-length sequence of queries with unknown types, each drawn independently. This ...

Online service platforms have transformed how customers and suppliers connect in real-time, using centralized dispatch and pricing systems. However, by acting as "central planners", platforms risk undermining the workers' flexibility endorsed by the ...

In this paper I report the results of an experiment where I continuously monitor how participants spend time on digital services and shut off their access to Instagram or YouTube on their phones for 1 or 2 weeks. I use the resulting data on how ...

We conduct a 6 month field experiment on a movie-recommendation platform to identify if and how recommendation systems affect consumption. We use within-consumer randomization at the good level and elicit beliefs about unconsumed goods to disentangle ...

We study a setting with a decision maker making a binary decision by aggregating information from symmetric agents. Each agent provides the decision maker a recommendation depending on her private signal about the hidden state. We assume that agents ...

In a misspecified social learning setting, agents are condescending if they perceive their peers as having private information that is of lower quality than it is in reality. Applying this to a standard sequential model, we show that outcomes improve ...

Many traditional approaches to constructing confidence intervals for randomized experiments with binary outcomes are based on a binomial model for the outcome distribution. However, the assumptions underlying the binomial model are highly problematic ...

Large corporations, local governments, and state agencies often seek suppliers for various different contracts through a sequence of auction rounds. In these extensive procurement markets, bidders frequently participate in multiple auctions held ...

We study the welfare structure in two-sided matching markets when agents have latent preferences generated according to observed characteristics. Specifically, we are interested in the empirical welfare distribution of agents on each side of the ...

Multi-item revenue-optimal mechanisms are known to be extremely complex, often offering buyers randomized lotteries of goods. In the standard buy-one model, it is known that optimal mechanisms can yield revenue infinitely higher than that of any "...

In this paper we revisit the notion of simplicity in mechanisms. We consider a seller of m heterogeneous items, facing a single buyer with valuation v. We observe that previous attempts to define complexity measures often fail to classify mechanisms ...

We explore the performance of polynomial-time incentive-compatible mechanisms in single-crossing domains. Single-crossing domains were extensively studied in the economics literature. Roughly speaking, a domain is single crossing if monotonicity ...