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Robust Contracts: A Revealed Preference Approach

Published:07 July 2023Publication History

ABSTRACT

We study an agency model in which the principal has outcome data under different incentive schemes and aims to design an optimal contract under minimal assumptions about the way the agent responds to incentives. Events unfold as follows: (1) the principal offers a contract---a mapping from output to nonnegative payments; (2) the agent chooses costly action---a probability distribution over output; and (3) output and payoffs are realized. The principal has outcome data under K different contracts which, sidestepping estimation error, enables her to recover the action corresponding to each of these contracts. We assume that the agent best-responds to the offered contract and has quasi-linear preferences over money and actions, but we make no further assumptions about the production environment. The principal does not have prior beliefs about any of the unknown aspects of the environment. Instead, she seeks a contract that maximizes worst-case profit.

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    • Published in

      cover image ACM Conferences
      EC '23: Proceedings of the 24th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation
      July 2023
      1253 pages
      ISBN:9798400701047
      DOI:10.1145/3580507

      Copyright © 2023 Owner/Author(s)

      Permission to make digital or hard copies of part or all of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for third-party components of this work must be honored. For all other uses, contact the owner/author(s).

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      Association for Computing Machinery

      New York, NY, United States

      Publication History

      • Published: 7 July 2023

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