Martino Banchio
ABSTRACT
Learning algorithms are proliferating in a variety of business contexts, ranging from automated bidding in online auctions to pricing on shopping platforms and setting rents. This diffusion has been accompanied by fears that such automation could facilitate collusion. A number of recent papers on algorithmic pricing show in simulations that learning algorithms coordinate on less-than-competitive outcomes.
Index Terms
- Adaptive Algorithms and Collusion via Coupling
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