Mete Şeref Ahunbay
ABSTRACT
According to the fundamental theorems of welfare economics, any competitive equilibrium is Pareto efficient. Unfortunately, competitive equilibrium prices only exist under strong assumptions such as perfectly divisible goods and convex preferences. In many real-world markets, participants have non-convex preferences and the allocation problem needs to consider complex constraints. Electricity markets are a prime example, but similar problems appear in many real-world markets, which has led to a growing literature in market design.
Index Terms
- Pricing Optimal Outcomes in Coupled and Non-Convex Electricity Markets
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