Roberto Corrao
ABSTRACT
We study optimal information mediation in sender-receiver communication games where the sender has transparent motives: she only cares about the receiver's actions and beliefs. An uninformed mediator cannot directly take the relevant decision in place of the receiver, but can credibly commit to information transmission policies. By the revelation principle, the mediator acts "as-if" selecting a communication equilibrium outcome of the sender-receiver game to maximize her expected payoff.
Index Terms
- Mediated Communication with Transparent Motives
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