Shixuan Ren
ABSTRACT
With the development of smart internet-connected vehicles, in-vehicle networks are facing increasing security threats. Controller Area Network (CAN), as the most commonly used communication method in vehicles, has become the main target of malicious network attacks due to its lack of security. This paper focuses on three common attack methods: CAN message injection, replay and Dos attack, and designs five attack experiments based on these three methods. Due to the upgrading of vehicle electronic and electrical architectures, the traditional three CAN attack experiments cannot affect most new vehicles. This paper proposes an experimental method based on UDS (Unified Diagnostic Services) CAN message injection and DoS attack, which causes functional interference in new vehicles, and proposes protective measures to safeguard the security of in-vehicle CAN network based on the analysis of the experiments. Network security protection measures are proposed based on the experimental analysis.
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Index Terms
- In-Vehicle Network Attack Based on CAN and UDS: Demonstration and Analysis
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