Cited By
View all- Usman AAsplund M(2024)Remote Attestation with Software Updates in Embedded Systems2024 IEEE Conference on Communications and Network Security (CNS)10.1109/CNS62487.2024.10735526(1-6)Online publication date: 30-Sep-2024
Provably Secure Communication Protocols for Remote Attestation
ARES '24: Proceedings of the 19th International Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security
Article No.: 1, Pages 1 - 12
Abstract
Remote Attestation is emerging as a promising technique to ensure that some remote device is in a trustworthy state. This can for example be an IoT device that is attested by a cloud service before allowing the device to connect. However, flaws in the communication protocols associated with the remote attestation mechanism can introduce vulnerabilities into the system design and potentially nullify the added security. Formal verification of protocol security can help to prevent such flaws. In this work we provide a detailed analysis of the necessary security properties for remote attestation focusing on the authenticity of the involved agents. We extend beyond existing work by considering the possibility of an attestation server (making the attestation process involve three parties) as well as requiring verifier authentication. We demonstrate that some security properties are not met by a state-of-the-art commercial protocol for remote attestation for our strong adversary model. Moreover, we design two new communication protocols for remote attestation that we formally prove fulfil all of the considered authentication properties.
References
[1]
Tigist Abera, N. Asokan, Lucas Davi, Jan-Erik Ekberg, Thomas Nyman, Andrew Paverd, Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi, and Gene Tsudik. 2016. C-FLAT: Control-Flow Attestation for Embedded Systems Software. In Proceedings of the 2016 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security (Vienna, Austria) (CCS ’16). Association for Computing Machinery, New York, NY, USA, 743–754. https://doi.org/10.1145/2976749.2978358
[2]
Nadarajah Asokan, Valtteri Niemi, and Kaisa Nyberg. 2003. Man-in-the-middle in tunnelled authentication protocols. In International Workshop on Security Protocols. Springer, 28–41.
[3]
Michael Backes, Matteo Maffei, and Dominique Unruh. 2008. Zero-Knowledge in the Applied Pi-calculus and Automated Verification of the Direct Anonymous Attestation Protocol. In 2008 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (sp 2008). 202–215. https://doi.org/10.1109/SP.2008.23
[4]
David Basin, Jannik Dreier, Lucca Hirschi, Saša Radomirovic, Ralf Sasse, and Vincent Stettler. 2018. A Formal Analysis of 5G Authentication. In Proceedings of the 2018 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security (Toronto, Canada) (CCS ’18). Association for Computing Machinery, New York, NY, USA, 1383–1396. https://doi.org/10.1145/3243734.3243846
[5]
David Basin, Ralf Sasse, and Jorge Toro-Pozo. 2021. The EMV Standard: Break, Fix, Verify. In 2021 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP). 1766–1781. https://doi.org/10.1109/SP40001.2021.00037
[6]
Karthikeyan Bhargavan, Bruno Blanchet, and Nadim Kobeissi. 2017. Verified Models and Reference Implementations for the TLS 1.3 Standard Candidate. In 2017 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP). 483–502. https://doi.org/10.1109/SP.2017.26
[7]
George Coker, Joshua Guttman, Peter Loscocco, Amy Herzog, Jonathan Millen, Brian O’Hanlon, John Ramsdell, Ariel Segall, Justin Sheehy, and Brian Sniffen. 2011. Principles of remote attestation. International Journal of Information Security 10, 2 (2011), 63–81.
[8]
Cas Cremers and Martin Dehnel-Wild. 2019. Component-based formal analysis of 5G-AKA: Channel assumptions and session confusion. In Network and Distributed System Security Symposium (NDSS). Internet Society.
[9]
Cas Cremers, Marko Horvat, Jonathan Hoyland, Sam Scott, and Thyla van der Merwe. 2017. A Comprehensive Symbolic Analysis of TLS 1.3. In Proceedings of the 2017 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security (Dallas, Texas, USA) (CCS ’17). Association for Computing Machinery, New York, NY, USA, 1773–1788. https://doi.org/10.1145/3133956.3134063
[10]
Cas Cremers, Marko Horvat, Sam Scott, and Thyla van der Merwe. 2016. Automated Analysis and Verification of TLS 1.3: 0-RTT, Resumption and Delayed Authentication. In 2016 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP). 470–485. https://doi.org/10.1109/SP.2016.35
[11]
Ivan De Oliveira Nunes, Sashidhar Jakkamsetti, Norrathep Rattanavipanon, and Gene Tsudik. 2021. On the TOCTOU Problem in Remote Attestation. In Proceedings of the 2021 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security (Virtual Event, Republic of Korea) (CCS ’21). Association for Computing Machinery, New York, NY, USA, 2921–2936. https://doi.org/10.1145/3460120.3484532
[12]
Dorothy E. Denning and Giovanni Maria Sacco. 1981. Timestamps in Key Distribution Protocols. Commun. ACM 24, 8 (aug 1981), 533–536. https://doi.org/10.1145/358722.358740
[13]
D. Dolev and A. Yao. 1983. On the security of public key protocols. IEEE Transactions on Information Theory 29, 2 (1983), 198–208. https://doi.org/10.1109/TIT.1983.1056650
[14]
Aurélien Francillon, Quan Nguyen, Kasper B. Rasmussen, and Gene Tsudik. 2014. A minimalist approach to Remote Attestation. In 2014 Design, Automation Test in Europe Conference Exhibition (DATE). 1–6. https://doi.org/10.7873/DATE.2014.257
[15]
Trusted Computing Group. 2019. TCG Trusted Attestation Protocol (TAP) Information Model for TPM Families 1.2 and 2.0 and DICE Family 1.0. https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/TNC_TAP_Information_Model_v1.00_r0.36-FINAL.pdf Ver. 1.0, Rev. 0.36. Last accessed 27 February 2024.
[16]
Gavin Lowe. 1996. Breaking and fixing the Needham-Schroeder Public-Key Protocol using FDR. In Tools and Algorithms for the Construction and Analysis of Systems, Tiziana Margaria and Bernhard Steffen (Eds.). Springer Berlin Heidelberg, Berlin, Heidelberg, 147–166.
[17]
G. Lowe. 1997. A hierarchy of authentication specifications. In Proceedings 10th Computer Security Foundations Workshop. 31–43. https://doi.org/10.1109/CSFW.1997.596782
[18]
Simon Meier, Benedikt Schmidt, Cas Cremers, and David Basin. 2013. The TAMARIN Prover for the Symbolic Analysis of Security Protocols. In Computer Aided Verification, Natasha Sharygina and Helmut Veith (Eds.). Springer Berlin Heidelberg, Berlin, Heidelberg, 696–701.
[19]
Ivan De Oliveira Nunes, Karim Eldefrawy, Norrathep Rattanavipanon, Michael Steiner, and Gene Tsudik. 2019. VRASED: A Verified Hardware/Software Co-Design for Remote Attestation. In 28th USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 19). USENIX Association, Santa Clara, CA, 1429–1446. https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity19/presentation/de-oliveira-nunes
[20]
Ivan De Oliveira Nunes, Karim Eldefrawy, Norrathep Rattanavipanon, and Gene Tsudik. 2020. APEX: A Verified Architecture for Proofs of Execution on Remote Devices under Full Software Compromise. In 29th USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 20). USENIX Association, 771–788. https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity20/presentation/nunes
[21]
Bryan Parno, Jonathan M. McCune, and Adrian Perrig. 2010. Bootstrapping Trust in Commodity Computers. In 2010 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy. 414–429. https://doi.org/10.1109/SP.2010.32
[22]
Lukas Petzi, Ala Eddine Ben Yahya, Alexandra Dmitrienko, Gene Tsudik, Thomas Prantl, and Samuel Kounev. 2022. SCRAPS: Scalable Collective Remote Attestation for Pub-Sub IoT Networks with Untrusted Proxy Verifier. In 31st USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 22). USENIX Association, Boston, MA, 3485–3501. https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity22/presentation/petzi
[23]
Reiner Sailer, Xiaolan Zhang, Trent Jaeger, and Leendert Van Doorn. 2004. Design and implementation of a TCG-based integrity measurement architecture. In USENIX Security symposium, Vol. 13. 223–238.
[24]
Samsung. 2023. Real-time Kernel Protection (RKP). https://docs.samsungknox.com/admin/fundamentals/whitepaper/samsung-knox-for-android/core-platform-security/real-time-kernel-protection/ Last accessed 27 February 2024.
[25]
Samsung. n.d. Welcome to Knox Attestation. (n.d.). https://docs.samsungknox.com/dev/knox-attestation/enhanced-attestation-v3/ Last accessed 27 February 2024.
[26]
Muhammad Usama Sardar, Saidgani Musaev, and Christof Fetzer. 2021. Demystifying Attestation in Intel Trust Domain Extensions via Formal Verification. IEEE Access 9 (2021), 83067–83079. https://doi.org/10.1109/ACCESS.2021.3087421
[27]
Muhammad Usama Sardar, Do Le Quoc, and Christof Fetzer. 2020. Towards Formalization of Enhanced Privacy ID (EPID)-based Remote Attestation in Intel SGX. In 2020 23rd Euromicro Conference on Digital System Design (DSD). 604–607. https://doi.org/10.1109/DSD51259.2020.00099
[28]
Vinnie Scarlata, Simon Johnson, James Beaney, and Piotr Zmijewski. 2018. Supporting third party attestation for Intel® SGX with Intel® data center attestation primitives. White paper (2018), 12.
[29]
Benedikt Schmidt. 2012. Formal analysis of key exchange protocols and physical protocols. Ph. D. Dissertation. ETH Zurich.
[30]
Benedikt Schmidt, Simon Meier, Cas Cremers, and David Basin. 2012. Automated Analysis of Diffie-Hellman Protocols and Advanced Security Properties. In 2012 IEEE 25th Computer Security Foundations Symposium. 78–94. https://doi.org/10.1109/CSF.2012.25
[31]
Ben Smyth, Mark D. Ryan, and Liqun Chen. 2015. Formal analysis of privacy in Direct Anonymous Attestation schemes. Science of Computer Programming 111 (2015), 300–317. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.scico.2015.04.004 Special Issue on Automated Verification of Critical Systems (AVoCS 2013).
[32]
David Wagner, Bruce Schneier, 1996. Analysis of the SSL 3.0 protocol. In The Second USENIX Workshop on Electronic Commerce Proceedings, Vol. 1. 29–40.
[33]
Stephan Wesemeyer, Christopher J.P. Newton, Helen Treharne, Liqun Chen, Ralf Sasse, and Jorden Whitefield. 2020. Formal Analysis and Implementation of a TPM 2.0-Based Direct Anonymous Attestation Scheme. In Proceedings of the 15th ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security (Taipei, Taiwan) (ASIA CCS ’20). Association for Computing Machinery, New York, NY, USA, 784–798. https://doi.org/10.1145/3320269.3372197
[34]
Jorden Whitefield, Liqun Chen, Ralf Sasse, Steve Schneider, Helen Treharne, and Stephan Wesemeyer. 2019. A symbolic analysis of ecc-based direct anonymous attestation. In 2019 IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy (EuroS&P). IEEE, 127–141.
[35]
Johannes Wilson. 2023. Formally Verified Remote Attestation Protocols with Strong Authentication. Linköping University (2023). [Master’s Thesis].
[36]
Johannes Wilson, Mikael Asplund, and Niklas Johansson. 2023. Extending the Authentication Hierarchy with One-Way Agreement. In IEEE 36th Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF). IEEE Computer Society, 377–391. https://doi.org/10.1109/CSF57540.2023.00025
[37]
Shaza Zeitouni, Ghada Dessouky, Orlando Arias, Dean Sullivan, Ahmad Ibrahim, Yier Jin, and Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi. 2017. ATRIUM: Runtime attestation resilient under memory attacks. In 2017 IEEE/ACM International Conference on Computer-Aided Design (ICCAD). 384–391. https://doi.org/10.1109/ICCAD.2017.8203803
Index Terms
- Provably Secure Communication Protocols for Remote Attestation
Recommendations
Establishing Secure Communication Channels Using Remote Attestation with TPM 2.0
Security and Trust ManagementAbstractRemote attestation allows a verifier to remotely check the integrity of a trusted computing platform. In recent years a number of attestation protocols based on Trusted Platform Modules (TPMs) have been proposed. These protocols cryptographically ...
Verifying List Swarm Attestation Protocols
WiSec '23: Proceedings of the 16th ACM Conference on Security and Privacy in Wireless and Mobile NetworksSwarm attestation protocols extend remote attestation by allowing a verifier to efficiently measure the integrity of software code running on a collection of heterogeneous devices across a network. Many swarm attestation protocols have been proposed for ...
Remote Attestation for Low-End Prover Devices with Post-Quantum Capabilities
CODASPY '18: Proceedings of the Eighth ACM Conference on Data and Application Security and PrivacyRemote attestation is a well-established interactive technique to establish trust in the realm of connected devices. It allows a Prover device to attest its platform integrity to a Verifier device. Existing remote attestation protocols rely on classical ...
Comments
Information & Contributors
Information
Published In
July 2024
2032 pages
ISBN:9798400717185
DOI:10.1145/3664476
Copyright © 2024 Owner/Author.
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution International 4.0 License.
Publisher
Association for Computing Machinery
New York, NY, United States
Publication History
Published: 30 July 2024
Check for updates
Badges
Best Paper
Author Tags
Qualifiers
- Research-article
- Research
- Refereed limited
Funding Sources
Conference
ARES 2024
ARES 2024: The 19th International Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security
July 30 - August 2, 2024
Vienna, Austria
Acceptance Rates
Overall Acceptance Rate 228 of 451 submissions, 51%
Contributors
Other Metrics
Bibliometrics & Citations
Bibliometrics
Article Metrics
- View Citations1Total Citations
- 423Total Downloads
- Downloads (Last 12 months)423
- Downloads (Last 6 weeks)117
Reflects downloads up to 05 Mar 2025
Other Metrics
Citations
Cited By
View all- Usman AAsplund M(2024)Remote Attestation with Software Updates in Embedded Systems2024 IEEE Conference on Communications and Network Security (CNS)10.1109/CNS62487.2024.10735526(1-6)Online publication date: 30-Sep-2024
View Options
View options
View or Download as a PDF file.
PDFeReader
View online with eReader.
eReaderHTML Format
View this article in HTML Format.
HTML FormatLogin options
Check if you have access through your login credentials or your institution to get full access on this article.
Sign in