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View all- Immorlica NKanoria YLu J(undefined)When does Competition and Costly Information Acquisition Lead to a Deadlock?SSRN Electronic Journal10.2139/ssrn.3697165
Iterative auctions can reach an outcome before all bidders have revealed all their preference information. This can decrease costs associated with communication, deliberation, and loss of privacy. We propose an explicit cost model that is inspired by ...
We present the results of a large field experiment on setting reserve prices in auctions for online advertisements, guided by the theory of optimal auction design suitably adapted to the sponsored search setting. Consistent with the theory, following ...
Most research on auctions assumes that potential bidders have private information about their willingness to pay for the item being auctioned, and that they use this information strategically when formulating their bids. In reality, bidders often have ...
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