Marc Rennhard
ABSTRACT
Traditional mix-based systems are composed of a small set of static, well known, and highly reliable mixes. To resist traffic analysis attacks at a mix, cover traffic must be used, which results in significant bandwidth overhead. End-to-end traffic analysis attacks are even more difficult to counter because there are only a few entry-and exit-points in the system. Static mix networks also suffer from scalability problems and in several countries, institutions operating a mix could be targeted by legal attacks. In this paper, we introduce MorphMix, a system for peer-to-peer based anonymous Internet usage. Each MorphMix node is a mix and anyone can easily join the system. We believe that MorphMix overcomes or reduces several drawbacks of static mix networks. In particular, we argue that our approach offers good protection from traffic analysis attacks without employing cover traffic. But MorphMix also introduces new challenges. One is that an adversary can easily operate several malicious nodes in the system and try to break the anonymity of legitimate users by getting full control over their anonymous paths. To counter this attack, we have developed a collusion detection mechanism, which allows to identify compromised paths with high probability before they are being used.
- Adam Back, Ian Goldberg, and Adam Shostack. Freedom 2.1 Security Issues and Analysis. White Paper, http://www.freedom.net/info/whitepapers/Freedom_Security2-1.pdf, May 3 2001.]]Google Scholar
- Oliver Berthold, Hannes Federrath, and Marit Köhntopp. Project "Anonymity and Unobservability in the Internet". In Proceedings of the Workshop on Freedom and Privacy by Design / Conference on Freedom and Privacy 2000 CFP, pages 57--65, Toronto, Canada, April 4--7 2000.]] Google ScholarDigital Library
- Oliver Berthold, Hannes Federrath, and Stefan Köpsell. Web MIXes: A System for Anonymous and Unobservable Internet Access. In Designing Privacy Enhancing Technologies, volume 2009 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 115--129. Springer Verlag, 2000.]] Google Scholar
- Philippe Boucher, Adam Shostack, and Ian Goldberg. Freedom Systems 2.0 Architecture. White Paper, http://www.freedom.net/info/whitepapers/Freedom_System_2_Architecture.pdf, December 18 2000.]]Google Scholar
- David L. Chaum. Untraceable Electronic Mail, Return Adresses, and Digital Pseudonyms. Communications of the ACM, 24(2):84--88, February 1981.]] Google ScholarDigital Library
- Lance Cottrell. Mixmaster Software. http://www.obscura.com/~loki/remailer/remailer-essay.html.]]Google Scholar
- Wei Dai. PipeNet. http://www.eskimo.com/~weidai/pipenet.txt.]]Google Scholar
- George Danezis, Roger Dingledine, David Hopwood, and Nick Mathewson. Mixminion: Design of a Type III Anonymous Remailer Protocol. Manuscript, http://mixminion.net, 2002.]]Google Scholar
- W. Diffie and M. E. Hellman. New directions in cryptography. IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, 22(6):644--654, November 1976.]]Google ScholarDigital Library
- Roger Dingledine, Michael Freedman, David Hopwood, and David Molnar. A Reputation System to Increase MIX-net Reliability. In Proceedings of 4th International Information Hiding Workshop, pages 126--141, Pittsburg, PA, USA, April 2001.]] Google ScholarDigital Library
- Michael J. Freedman and Robert Morris. Tarzan: A Peer-to-Peer Anonymizing Network Layer. In Proceedings of the 9th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS 2002), Washington, D.C., USA, November 2002.]] Google ScholarDigital Library
- R. Housely and W. Polk. Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure. RFC 2528, 1999.]]Google Scholar
- Andreas Pfitzmann and Marit Köhntopp. Anonymity, Unobservability, and Pseudonymity---A Proposal for Terminology; Draft v0.12. http://www.koehntopp.de/marit/pub/anon/Anon_Terminology.pdf, June 17 2001.]]Google Scholar
- Michael Reed, Paul Syverson, and David Goldschlag. Anonymous Connections and Onion Routing. IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications, 16(4):482--494, May 1998.]]Google ScholarDigital Library
- Michael K. Reiter and Aviel D. Rubin. Crowds: Anonymity for Web Transactions. ACM Transactions on Information and System Security, 1(1):66--92, November 1998.]] Google ScholarDigital Library
- Marc Rennhard. MorphMix: Peer-to-Peer based Anonymous Internet Usage with Collusion Detection (available at http://www.tik.ee.ethz.ch/~rennhard/publications/morphmix.pdf). TIK Technical Report Nr. 147, TIK, ETH Zurich, Zurich, CH, August 2002.]]Google Scholar
- Marc Rennhard, Sandro Rafaeli, Laurent Mathy, Bernhard Plattner, and David Hutchison. An Architecture for an Anonymity Network. In Proceedings of the IEEE 10th Intl. Workshop on Enabling Technologies: Infrastructure for Collaborative Enterprises (WET ICE 2001), pages 165--170, Boston, USA, June 20--22 2001.]] Google ScholarDigital Library
- Marc Rennhard, Sandro Rafaeli, Laurent Mathy, Bernhard Plattner, and David Hutchison. Analysis of an Anonymity Network for Web Browsing. In Proceedings of the IEEE 11th Intl. Workshop on Enabling Technologies: Infrastructure for Collaborative Enterprises (WET ICE 2002), pages 49--54, Pittsburgh, USA, June l0--12 2002.]] Google ScholarDigital Library
- Andrei Serjantov, Roger Dingledine, and Paul Syverson. From a Trickle to a Flood: Active Attacks on Several Mix Types. In Proceedings of 5th International Information Hiding Workshop, Noordwijkerhout, Netherlands, October 2002.]] Google ScholarDigital Library
- Ion Stoica, Robert Morris, David Karger, M. Frans Kaashoek, and Hari Balakrishnan. Chord: A Scalable Peer-to-peer Lookup Service for Internet Applications. In Proceedings of the ACM SIGCOMM '01 Conference, San Diego, CA, USA, August 2001.]] Google ScholarDigital Library
- Paul Syverson, Gene Tsudik, Michael Reed, and Carl Landwehr. Towards an Analysis of Onion Routing Security. In Proceedings of the Workshop on Design Issues in Anonymity and Unobservability, pages 83--100, Berkeley, CA, USA, July 25--26 2000.]]Google ScholarCross Ref
- Marc Waldmann, Aviel D. Rubin, and Lorrie Faith Cranor. Publius: A Robust, Tamper-Evident, Censorship-Resistant Web Publishing System. In Proceedings of the 9th USENIX Security Symposium, August 2000.]] Google ScholarDigital Library
- Matt Wright, Micah Adler, Brian Neil Levine, and Clay Shields. An Analysis of the Degradation of Anonymous Protocols. In Proceedings of ISOC Network and Distributed System Security Symposium (NDSS 2002), San Diego, USA, February 2002.]]Google Scholar
Index Terms
- Introducing MorphMix: peer-to-peer based anonymous Internet usage with collusion detection
Recommendations
Protocol-level attacks against Tor
Tor is a real-world, circuit-based low-latency anonymous communication network, supporting TCP applications over the Internet. In this paper, we present an extensive study of protocol-level attacks against Tor. Different from existing attacks, the ...
A new cell counter based attack against tor
CCS '09: Proceedings of the 16th ACM conference on Computer and communications securityVarious low-latency anonymous communication systems such as Tor and Anoymizer have been designed to provide anonymity service for users. In order to hide the communication of users, many anonymity systems pack the application data into equal-sized cells ...
An Efficient Hybrid Peer-to-Peer System for Distributed Data Sharing
Peer-to-peer overlay networks are widely used in distributed systems. Based on whether a regular topology is maintained among peers, peer-to-peer networks can be divided into two categories: structured peer-to-peer networks in which peers are connected ...
Comments