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Resource allocation games with changing resource capacities

Published:14 July 2003Publication History

ABSTRACT

In this paper we study a class of resource allocation games which are inspired by the El Farol Bar problem. We consider a system of competitive agents that have to choose between several resources characterized by their time dependent capacities. The agents using a particular resource are rewarded if their number does not exceed the resource capacity, and punished otherwise. Agents use a set of strategies to decide what resource to choose, and use a simple reinforcement learning scheme to update the accuracy of strategies. A strategy in our model is simply a lookup table that suggests to an agent what resource to choose based on the actions of its neighbors at the previous time step. In other words, the agents form a social network whose connectivity controls the average number of neighbors with whom each agent interacts. This statement of the adaptive resource allocation problem allows us to fully parameterize it by a small set of numbers. We study the behavior of the system via numeric simulations of 100 to 5000 agents using one to ten resources. Our results indicate that for a certain range of parameters the system as a whole adapts effectively to the changing capacity levels and results in very little under- or over-utilization of the resources.

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        cover image ACM Conferences
        AAMAS '03: Proceedings of the second international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
        July 2003
        1200 pages
        ISBN:1581136838
        DOI:10.1145/860575

        Copyright © 2003 ACM

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        Publication History

        • Published: 14 July 2003

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