4th International ICST Workshop on Game Theory in Communication Networks

Research Article

Universal Linear Pricing for Multiple Access and Broadcast Channels under QoS Requirements

  • @INPROCEEDINGS{10.4108/icst.valuetools.2011.245795,
        author={Fei Shen and Eduard Jorswieck},
        title={Universal Linear Pricing for Multiple Access and Broadcast Channels under QoS Requirements},
        proceedings={4th International ICST Workshop on Game Theory in Communication Networks},
        publisher={ACM},
        proceedings_a={GAMECOMM},
        year={2012},
        month={6},
        keywords={linear pricing utility requirement power allocation cheating},
        doi={10.4108/icst.valuetools.2011.245795}
    }
    
  • Fei Shen
    Eduard Jorswieck
    Year: 2012
    Universal Linear Pricing for Multiple Access and Broadcast Channels under QoS Requirements
    GAMECOMM
    ICST
    DOI: 10.4108/icst.valuetools.2011.245795
Fei Shen1,*, Eduard Jorswieck1
  • 1: Dresden University of Technology
*Contact email: Fei.Shen@tu-dresden.de

Abstract

In this paper, we address the problem of power allocation in multiple access (MAC) and broadcast channels (BC) with linear pricing framework to ensure that each user in the interference network can achieve its utility requirement. In the framework the system optimizer maximizes the system utility with the pricing function. The existence of the universal linear pricing mechanism is characterized. Algorithms for solving the linear pricing problems in MAC and BC are proposed. The sufficient condition for linear pricing in MAC with successive interference cancelation (SIC) and its best decoding order are analyzed. The relation between the order of channel states, the optimal weights and prices, and the resulting cost is characterized. Moreover, we show that it is possible for users to cheat in their channel states in order to achieve better rates. Finally, we argue that there cannot be an incentive compatible mechanism design for this universal linear pricing scheme.